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Colorado Law Concerning
Accomplices and Complicity
by Marianne Wesson
@ 1989 Harrison Publishing Co.
C riminal law always has rec-
ognized that persons who
do not actually engage in
the conduct necessary to
the commission of a crime may never-
theless incur some criminal liability if
they contribute in certain ways to the
planning, encouragement or execution
of the crime.' Hence, the hiring party
as well as the contract killer may be
guilty of murder; the getaway driver as
well as the robber may be guilty of rob-
bery; and the fence as well as the thief
may be guilty of theft.2 Colorado pro-
vides that the guilt of the party who
does not actually commit the crime is
equal to that of the party who does,
provided the former's contribution to
the crime satisfies the principles of ac-
complice liability.3
The law of accomplice liability also is
known as the law of complicity or of ac-
countability. Because an individual con-
victed as an accessory faces precisely
the same punishment as one convicted
of the same crime as a principal,4 it is
imperative that Colorado attorneys un-
derstand the law of accomplice liability.
Statutory Background
CRS § 18-1-602(1) provides:
(1) A person is legally accountable
for the behavior of another if:
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(a) He is made accountable for the
conduct of that person by the
statute defining the offense or by
specific provision of this code; or
(b) He acts with the culpable mental
state sufficient for the commis-
sion of the offense in question
and he causes an innocent per-
son to engage in such behavior.
The second method [in (1)(b)] of es-
tablishing vicarious liability for the con-
duct of another is seldom invoked.5 It is
more common for cases of alleged ac-
complice liability to fall within subsec-
tion (1)(a), according to which the ac-
cused accomplice "is made accountable
for the conduct of [the actor] by the
statute defining the offense or by specif-
ic provision of [the Colorado Criminal
Code]." Further, in practically every re-
ported case, the source of the defen-
dant's accountability is not the statute
defining the offense, but rather "specific
provisions" of CRS § 18-1-603:
A person is legally accountable as
principal for the behavior of another
constituting a criminal offense if,
with the intent to promote or facili-
tate the commission of the offense, he
aids, abets, or advises the other per-
son in planning or committing the of-
fense.
This apparently simple language con-
ceals some uncertainty about exactly
what is required for accomplice liability
under its provisions. Employing the
usual dichotomy of acts and mental
states, questions might be asked about
(1) the conduct necessary to convict an
individual as an accomplice and (2) the
mental state or states necessary for
such a conviction.
The "Act" of Complicity
CRS § 18-1-603's designation of "aid-
ing, abetting, or advising" as the possi-
ble varieties of complicitous acts by no
means eliminates the uncertainties of
the matter of conduct. It has been held
that the term "abets" encompasses en-
couragement.6 Thus, in Colorado, an in-
dividual who sells a would-be criminal
an instrumentality that is necessary or
useful to the commission of the crime
may well have committed an act of com-
plicity.
In a case that predates the present
statute but appears to reflect the Col-
orado view of complicity, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that an innkeeper
who rented rooms to prostitutes could
This newsletter is prepared by the
Criminal Law Section of the Colorado
Bar Association. This month's column
was written by Marianne (Mimi)
Wesson, Boulder, associate professor
and associate vice-president for aca-
demic affairs at the University of
Colorado. A longer version of this
article appears in the author's book,
Crimes and Defenses in Colorado,
available from Harrison Publishing
Co., P.O. Box 7500, Norcross, GA
30091-7500; (800) 241-3561.
2318 THE COLORADO LAWYER December
be guilty of keeping and maintaining a
house of ill-fame. According to the
court, such conduct constituted "aiding,
abetting, and assisting" such an enter-
prise. If this case is still good law, it is
difficult to distinguish the tolerant
innkeeper from an individual who sells
a firearm to a bank robber or sells a
can of gasoline to an arsonist.
Distinctions may be made between
various cases of aid by considering dif-
ferences between the mental states of
the various aiders. This consideration,
however, requires an understanding of
what mental state or states are neces-
sary to the commission of a crime as an
accomplice.
The "Mens Rea"
Of Complicity
CRS § 18-1-603 designates the men-
tal state necessary for accomplice liabil-
ity as "intent to promote or facilitate
the commission of the offense." As it
has been interpreted in Colorado, this
language is somewhat ambiguous. It
seems at a minimum that an individual
could not be guilty of an offense as an
accomplice unless he or she had every
mental state necessary to the commis-
sion of the offense as a principal. For
example, to the extent an offense re-
quires knowledge of a circumstance, an
individual could not be guilty of the of-
fense as an accomplice without having
known of the circumstance at the time
of furnishing aid or encouragement.
The only Colorado decision that
seems to cast any doubt on this propo-
sition is People v. Simien.8 In Simien,
the trial court neglected to instruct the
jury in the elements of accomplice lia-
bility, but told it that the defendant
could only be convicted if he had every
mental state necessary to commit the
crime as a principal. The Court of Ap-
peals found no plain error in the trial
court's having failed to instruct the jury
in the elements of accomplice liability,
in light of its other mental state in-
struc tion.
The opinion in Simien seems to sug-
gest that the error, if any, inured to the
defendant's benefit.9 This suggestion, if
taken seriously, could lead to the con-
clusion that an individual may some-
times be convicted as an accomplice
without evidence that he or she had the
mens rea necessary to commit the of-
fense. Nevertheless, this proposition is
only vaguely hinted at and is contrary
to other precedentso and to common
sense.
Assuming that an individual must
display every mental state necessary to
the commission of the offense in order
to be convicted as an accomplice, the
question remains whether anything
more is required. Arguably, "intention
to promote or facilitate" means that
something more may be required, at
least where the crime committed by the
principal is one of knowledge, reckless-
ness or negligence, rather than one of
intention.
"Distinctions may be made
between various cases of aid
by considering differences
between the mental states
of the various aiders."
For example, an individual may com-
mit fourth-degree arson as a principal
with a mental state of recklessness (to-
ward the possibility that he or she is
creating a danger of death, injury or
damage)." It seems to strain the mean-
ing of the intent language, however, to
suggest that an equally reckless indi-
vidual who furnishes a match to such a
careless arsonist may be convicted as
an accomplice to fourth-degree arson. If
the match-supplier is merely careless
about the prospect of destruction by
fire, it is difficult at best to say that he
or she has "intention to promote or fa-
cilitate the commission of" fourth-de-
gree arson.
To equate the alleged accomplice's
recklessness to "intention" is to erase
the careful distinctions between the
various mental states that the Colorado
Criminal Code sets forth.12 Prior to re-
cent Colorado decisions, it seemed clear
that an individual could not be convict-
ed as an accomplice to any crime unless
he or she intended every consequential
element of the crime. This logical con-
clusion, however, has been rejected by
the Colorado courts, as discussed in the
following section.
Complicity in
Colorado Cases
In People v. R.V.," the Colorado
Supreme Court reviewed a delinquency
adjudication for the juvenile's complici-
ty in a theft. The trial judge had re-
fused to instruct the jury in the mean-
ing of "intentionally or with intent"
under the Criminal Code's definitions of
the various culpable mental states. Af-
firming the adjudication of delinquency,
the majority held that the instructions
did not offend the principle that a judge
should instruct on the meaning of every
mental state that is an element of the
offense. The court observed that complic-
ity is not itself an offense, but rather a
theory of liability for some offense de-
fined elsewhere in the Code. It then
held that the term "intent" in the
phrase "intent to promote or facilitate
the commission of the offense" does not
necessarily mean the same thing that
the phrase "intent" would mean in the
definition of a crime-that is, a con-
scious objective to cause a particular re-
sult.14
What alternative meaning the term
"intent to promote or facilitate the com-
mission of an offense" might have was
not addressed by the R.V court. The
opinion stated that the phrase was not
composed of "words of uncommon
meaning which are apt to be misunder-
stood by a jury and therefore require
further definition."
The R.V decision, then, rejected the
dissenters' view that conviction for com-
plicity necessarily requires "a purposive
attitude or conscious objective on the
part of the offender towards the comple-
tion of the crime."6 The less culpable or
less purposive attitude toward the
completion of the crime that might suf-
fice was hinted at in the Colorado
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Peo-
ple v. Krovarz.17
In Krovarz, the issue was similar to
that in R.V: whether the trial judge's
instructions concerning the definition of
a particular mental state were ade-
quate. The basis of the charge in Kro-
varz, however, was attempt rather than
complicity. The court recognized that at-
tempt, like complicity, is not a crime in
the abstract but can create liability only
in conjunction with some other offense
defined by the Criminal Code."' The at-
tempt statute by its language required
proof of "purpose to complete the com-
mission of the offense," and the court
earlier had held that "purpose" in that
context has the same meaning as "in-
tent."9 Nevertheless, in Krovarz the
court held that proof that the actor
knew his conduct would result in the
completed offense is sufficient for con-
viction of attempt. In other words, the
court ruled that in the context of an at-
tempt charge, knowledge is as good as
intent.
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In a later case concerning the law of
attempt, the court pushed that reason-
ing even further. In People v. Thomp-
son,20 the court held that a person may
be convicted of attempting a crime of
recklessness if that person "intends to
engage in acts or conduct that produce
a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death of another." Significantly, this for-
mulation does not require that the
actor intend to cause the consequential
element of the crime attempted. The re-
laxation of the mental state require-
ment for attempts in Krovarz and
Thompson presaged a similar loosening
of the law of accomplice liability.
When the precise question of the
mental state required for accomplice li-
ability for a non-specific intent crime
came before the Colorado Supreme
Court recently, its ruling was even
more surprising. In People v. Wheeler,21
a 1989 decision, the court held that a
person may be guilty of aiding and
abetting the crime of negligent homi-
cide even if that person has neither in-
tention nor knowledge that the victim
will die as a result of the principal's
conduct. It is sufficient, said the court,
that defendant intend to promote or fa-
cilitate the acts or conduct of the princi-
pal; it is not necessary that the defen-
dant's mental state be greater than
negligence toward the consequence of
death.22 This decision probably suggests
the end, in Colorado, of any distinction
between the mental state necessary to
commit a crime as a principal and that
necessary to commit the same crime as
an accomplice.
Evidence of Complicity
It has been held that an alleged ac-
complice may not be convicted without
evidence that the principal actually
committed the crime.n It is no defense
to a charge of complicity, however, that
the alleged principal was never prose-
cuted for the crime, or even that he or
she was acquitted of it.24 Courts occa-
sionally will say that mere presence at
the scene of a crime is by itself insuffi-
cient to establish accomplice liability?
Nevertheless, is is apparently unneces-
sary to give such an instruction to the
jury if the other requirements of accom-
plice liability are the subject of a proper
instruction.26
Furthermore, it may be possible to
convict a person on a showing that, al-
though neither the individual nor his or
her confederate has committed all of
the acts necessary to constitute the
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crime, between the two of them each
conduct element of the crime is satis-
fied. In such a case (or in any case, it
seems) the prosecution is not required
to commit itself, either in its accusation
or in its evidence, to a view about which
actor is the principal and which is the
accomplice. 28 Indeed, according to the
Colorado courts, it is possible for a per-
son to be charged as a principal and
convicted on a theory of complicity, or
vice versa, without any fatal variation
between the accusation and the proof.29
Exemptions, Exceptions and
Affirmative Defenses
CRS § 18-1-604 sets forth some ex-
emptions from, or exceptions to, the gen-
eral law of accomplice liability. In gen-
eral, these exceptions conform to cer-
tain exceptions recognized by the com-
mon law of complicity.30 An individual
cannot be convicted as an accomplice to
a crime if he or she is "a victim" of that
crime.31 Hence, a minor could not be con-
victed as an accomplice to a sexual of-
fense of which the minor was the vic-
tim, no matter how willing his or her
participation.
Somewhat more subtle is the excep-
tion for the defendant as to whom "the
offense is so defined that his conduct is
inevitably incidental to its commis-
sion. For example, CRS § 18-7-205
prohibits "patronizing a prostitute," an
offense that is so defined that it cannot
be committed without the participation
of a prostitute. Because the prostitute's
conduct is "inevitably incidental" to the
commission of the offense by the pa-
trons, he or she cannot be convicted as
an accomplice to their violations of § 18-
7-205. (Prostitutes may, however, be li-
able as a principal for any crimes that
their own conduct may amount to, no-
tably the crime of "prostitution" as de-
fined in CRS § 18-7-201.)
CRS § 18-1-604(2) also creates an af-
firmative defense to charges of accom-
plice liability. It provides:
It shall be an affirmative defense to a
charge under section 18-1-603 if,
prior to the commission of the of-
fense, the defendant terminated his
effort to promote or facilitate its com-
mission and either gave timely warn-
ing to law enforcement authorities or
gave timely warning to the intended
victim.
Although there are no decisions in Col-
orado construing this provision, it
seems at least somewhat problematic.
As discussed above, persons need not be
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"charged" under CRS § 18-1-603 in
order to be convicted on principles of ac-
complice liability.33 This circumstance
leaves uncertain the issue of when a
jury should be instructed concerning
the existence of this affirmative de-
fense. In this author's opinion, a sensi-
ble rule would require instruction in
this defense any time (1) the jury is in-
structed in the principles of accomplice
liability; and (2) there is some credible
evidence that the defendant can satisfy
the terms of the affirmative defense. 4
Relationship to
Accessorial Liability
The law of accomplice liability corre-
sponds roughly to the common law of
the liability of an "accessory before the
fact."3 5 At common law, liability also
could be imposed on accessories "after
the fact" who aided or harbored a felon
with knowledge that he or she had com-
mitted a crime.36 In Colorado, the latter
situation is addressed by the "Accessory
to Crime" statute, CRS § 18-8-105.x
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Conclusion
The law of accomplice liability in Col-
orado is subtle and not always logical.
The feature that most distinguishes it
from the law of other jurisdictions is the
erosion of the requirement that an
aider and abetter must intend to cause
every consequential element of a crime
in order to be guilty as an accomplice.
This development makes the law of
complicity in Colorado more attractive
to the prosecutor, and a charge of com-
plicity more difficult to defend against,
than is the case in most American juris-
dictions.
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